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Abstract and Keywords 
In this ch apter, t he embodie d consciou s n ess of clu bbing a nd ravin g is conside r ed 
throu g h t he theory of ext en ded mind, accord ing t o w hich the mind is a 
d istrib uted syst em w here brain , b ody, a nd environment play equa l p arts. 
Bu ildin g on the idea of mus ic as affective a t mosp here, a case is made for 
considering t he vibe of a da nce party as cognitively, socially, and affectively 
distrib uted . The chapt e r su g gests tha t p a rticipa ting in the vib e affords primary 
mus ical conscious ness- a kind of p re-reflexive st a t e ch aract e rized by affective 
an d bodily knowledge- and speculates ab out t he n eu ral correlat es of clubbing 
an d raving by means of an a nalogy with b rain r esearch on psychedelic sta t es. 
Keywords: dance music, clubbing, raving, vibe, extended mind, psychedelic 
Introduction 
I was a t 'Unity II' rave this past weekend, a nd I h ad t he m ost wonderful 
experien ce. As the dj played his trance set I could fee l the en ergy com e out 
of the sp eakers, diffuse in t o the souls and minds of all the dan cers a n d 
then r eflect b ack out into the room . It was t he m ost incredible , almost 
overwh elmin g, fee ling of love a nd t ranquility I have ever exp erien ced. I 
looked a t the others around m e and I could see in their eyes the very peace 
an d warmth tha t I was fee ling. Their gestures and t he way t hey dan ced 
only a mplified t his 'vib e ' an d contin u ed it t hrough the night , a nd I 
wondered if we were a ll living in a dream ... 
PLUR 
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keep the vibe alive!!!
P.M. West (1996) on hyperreal.org
The opening description was posted on hyperreal.org, a website that among 
other rave-related material (such as photo and flyer galleries, and information 
on music, DJs, labels, and drugs) features a series of ‘rave testimonials’ from the 
1990s. This decade saw the rise of a youth subculture whose members spent 
their weekends in abandoned warehouses or fields where sometimes thousands 
of people would dance until the early morning to electronic dance music such as 
house, techno, trance, and drum-and-bass. After a legal crackdown in the 1990s, 
rave developed into a club and festival scene, which remains a huge musical 
subculture and night-time economy. Some nightclubs, such as the famous 
Berghain in Berlin, have acquired an international cult reputation and have been 
given a tax status as a ‘cultural venue’ on a par with classical concert halls 
(Oltermann 2016). Other clubs have faced revoked licences and permanent 
closure due to zoning, gentrification, and concerns about drugs (Garcia 2016). In 
the UK, there has been a rave renaissance (Gilmour 2016), and regardless of 
official cultural or moral stances, dance music culture has become a global 
musical phenomenon, with world-famous DJs playing every weekend in virtually 
every big city in the world.
 (p.94) P.M. West’s post on the hyperreal.org website is a typical example of 
how ravers describe raving and clubbing. The recognition of one’s own emotions 
in the eyes of the surrounding dancers vividly conveys the sense that the 
affective experience of the rave is shared among the ravers. West describes the 
energy travelling between the speakers, the dancers’ souls and minds, and the 
space that surrounds them, connecting their bodies, the music, and the 
environment. The rave mantra ‘PLUR’ (standing for Peace, Love, Unity, and 
Respect) encapsulates the emotions they share, echoed in the name of the rave, 
‘Unity II’. West attributes the diffused energy to the ‘vibe’ of the rave, a force 
that needs to be ‘kept alive’, and which the dancers feed with their movements, 
amplifying its intensity and duration, leading West to wonder if they have 
entered a different kind of consciousness—more like a dream than waking 
reality.
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This raver’s reflection resonates well with ethnographers’ accounts of dance 
music cultures, and many of the emerging themes in these accounts—collective 
emotions, unity, distributed energy, vibe, and altered states of consciousness—
appear frequently in cultural and sociological studies. Such studies focus largely 
on how these experiences relate to identity politics (Fikentscher 2000; Lawrence 
2011; Rief 2011), youth culture (Thornton 1995), and political resistance—or the 
lack of it (Gilbert and Pearson 1999; Jordan 1995). To complement these studies, 
this chapter takes a phenomenological approach to dancing, clubbing, and 
raving as a form of embodied consciousness, and considers how the 
neurofunctional architecture of the brain might contribute to such modes of 
consciousness. It looks at how this musical activity is cognitively, socially, 
corporeally, and emotionally distributed in the affective atmosphere of the vibe—
a force field that is co-determined by the beats and sounds of the music, the 
dancers’ gestures and emotional expressions, the DJ’s dynamic performance, the 
visual effects and temperature of the environment, and often—but not always—
drugs, such as MDMA, alcohol, and psychedelics. The vibe is considered as a 
non-anthropocentric force where subjectivity is not just shared between people 
but is diffused across a greater, and partially non-human whole. Participation in 
this vibe affords a kind of pre-reflexive consciousness in which affective and 
bodily knowledge trumps analytical and reflexive knowledge. Finally, the chapter 
speculates about the neural make-up of a dance-induced ecstatic brain by 
analogy with neuroimaging research on the effect of psychedelic drugs.
Distributed mind: Cognitive, social, and affective extensions
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The blurring of subject–object distinctions in cognition is a central argument in 
Extended Mind Theory (EMT), first proposed by Andy Clark and David Chalmers 
(1998; see also Clark 2008). Often viewed as the most extreme of the 4Es 
(situated views of the mind referred to as Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, and 
Extended; see Rowlands 2010), EMT rejects the view that mental processes 
happen exclusively within the confines of the skull, asserting instead that these 
processes extend across the brain, the body, and the environment. Cognition is 
not just connected to the outside world through active engagement and  (p.95) 
bodily sensation: there are no fixed boundaries at all between the brain, the 
body, and the environment. The relationship between the mind and the 
environment is malleable and dynamic, and cognition is thus fundamentally 
redefined as a system in which brain, body, and world play equal parts. The 
external objects that we use in cognitive processing are not simply tools but are 
fully part of the cognitive process itself. According to the widely cited ‘parity 
principle’ (Clark and Chalmers 1998), external objects are to be understood as 
components of cognitive systems when they function indistinguishably from
processes taking place in the brain.1 A smartphone, for example, with inbuilt 
functions such as diary, contact book, internet browser, and calculator, performs 
some of the mental work that is needed to remember an appointment, a phone 
number, or a historical fact, or to perform a mathematical calculation. The phone 
is functionally equivalent to a part of our brain when we use it, and is therefore 
properly understood as a component of a distributed mental system.
While EMT was originally a cognitive theory (Clark 2009), some have since then 
taken a more liberal view and have argued that the mind can be extended in 
other, more subjective ways. Shaun Gallagher’s understanding of EMT (2011, 
2013) goes beyond objects to include other subjects and groups of subjects, with 
socially distributed minds being exemplified in the legal system, scientific 
research, and the family. Gallagher asks us to consider a court case as an 
example in which judgements are not confined to the brains of individuals, but 
are distributed across judges, jury members, lawyers, experts, legal texts, 
cultural practices, and societal norms. Importantly, such judgements could in 
fact not be made solely inside the heads of individuals, and so the cognitive work 
is by definition extended and not just embedded: ‘the particular cognitive 
process of forming a legal judgment, is what it is only in that [legal] 
system’ (Gallagher 2013: 7). Gallagher specifies a more enactive than 
functionalist approach to cognitive distribution, and emphasizes that what is 
extended is not the actual materials of the brain, but rather its cognitive and 
social processes.
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EMT was also initially claimed to exclude extensions of conscious experience 
(Clark 2009), but more recently some have argued that emotions can also be 
distributed (Stephan et al. 2013). On the premise that cognition and emotion 
cannot be separated, Jan Slaby (2014) argues that our embodied engagements 
with the world are inextricable from our emotional experience of it, and he thus 
situates emotions within the EMT framework. By definition, emotions are 
relational—they are towards something: a landscape, a lover, our self-image, or a 
piece of music—with the consequence that these scenes, things, events, or 
people to which the emotions relate must be seen as part of a distributed 
affective system. Slaby (2014), like Gallagher (2013), argues that this relational 
rather than locational definition of embodiment brings EMT closer to enactivist 
theories: enactivists  (p.96) argue that perception and cognition are processual 
because they are forms of active engagement with the environment (Thompson 
2010). Thus, seeing emotions as a reciprocal active process between organism 
and world renders the question of ‘where’ emotions are located—whether inside 
or outside the brain—irrelevant. Slaby introduces the notion of ‘phenomenal 
coupling’ to ‘define the direct, online engagements of an agent’s affectivity with 
an environmental structure or process that itself manifests affect-like, 
expressive qualities’ (2014: 41), and he lists music as one such example.
Joel Krueger (2013) (see also this volume, Chapter 3) argues that music offers 
particularly powerful ways of extending our emotions. Many people use music to 
regulate their emotions and identity, as captured in Tia De Nora’s 
characterization of music as ‘a technology of the self’ (DeNora 2000). Krueger 
proposes that music acts as ‘affective scaffolding’, allowing us to ‘offload’ some 
of the regulatory processes involved in our emotions onto the dynamics, 
rhythmic structures, harmonic progressions, and lyrics of music. One of the core 
principles that enables this kind of musical extension of emotions is entrainment
—the process by which two independent rhythmic processes are coupled to 
achieve a degree of synchrony (Jones 2009; Phillips-Silver et al. 2010; Trost et al. 
2017). As Krueger puts it, we engage with music by ‘synchronously organizing 
our reactive behavior and felt responses’ (2013: 4), giving rise to musically 
extended emotions that are more complex and powerful than those confined to 
the brain and body. Like music, other people can act as scaffolding for our 
emotions (Krueger 2015). When two or more individuals relate to each other 
through coordinated actions, intentions, and beliefs, emotional experiences and 
their regulatory processes can be interpersonally distributed. Here again it is 
the entrainment between two processes—in this case between two people—that 
provides the basis for interpersonally converging emotions. As in his account of 
music, Krueger sees shared emotions as special because their joint construction 
gives access to phenomenological experiences different from those that we 
experience on our own.
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But can emotions be shared beyond dyads, and what are the conditions for an 
emotion to be shared? Von Scheve and Ismer (2013) propose a bottom-up theory 
of how collective emotions come about and how they are shaped and embedded 
in culture. Collective emotions are defined as ‘synchronous convergence in 
affective responding across individuals towards a specific event or object’ (Von 
Scheve and Ismer 2013: 406). Here and elsewhere (Von Scheve and Salmela 
2014), the sociologist Emile Durkheim is cited as providing the first focused 
analysis of what he called ‘collective effervescence’ (Durkheim 1912/1995). He 
observed that when people congregate in rituals, ‘a sort of electricity is 
generated from their closeness [which] quickly launches them to an 
extraordinary height of exaltation. Every emotion resonates without interference 
in consciousnesses that are wide open to external impressions; each echoing the 
others’ (Durkheim 1912/1995: 217, cited in Von Scheve and Salmela 2013: xiv).
Von Scheve and Ismer (2013) propose that the face-to-face interaction of people 
in such gatherings affords shared emotions via motor mimicry and emotional 
contagion. Through synchronized gestures and joint attention, the emotional 
expressions of each agent are infectious and become mirrored both in the other 
agents’ bodily expressions  (p.97) and in their subjective feelings. But it is not 
just the proximity of people that affords shared emotions. Through shared 
exposure to cultural knowledge in norms, beliefs, and values, people have a 
tendency to respond to a given event in emotionally similar ways. Furthermore, 
people can experience emotions purely on the basis of the specific social groups 
to which they see themselves as belonging. No face-to-face interaction need take 
place in order to share an emotional disposition, such as the love of heavy-metal 
music or an aversion to bubblegum pop music; but when people share an actual 
physical space, such shared emotions can be amplified.
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If the mind can be extended cognitively, socially, and affectively, then we might 
ask whether the EMT hypothesis has any practical limits. Are there any 
situations or aspects of the mind that are entirely confined to the brain? Some 
might argue that dreams are inside the head, because an individual is not 
actively engaging with their environment during sleep. But the fact that external 
surroundings can sometimes be represented in dreams—as when the sound of 
an alarm clock appears in the dream as someone’s incoherent shouting—
challenges the idea that dreams are entirely intracranial (see also Windt 2017). 
There is more disagreement, however, about the extendedness of consciousness 
itself. In an ongoing discussion, cognitive philosophers are developing new 
answers to the question of whether the ‘vehicles’ or ‘circuitry’ of consciousness 
are distributed into the environment or confined to the brain. Andy Clark is a 
proponent of the latter argument (2009, 2012), insisting that while the contents
of conscious experience can be extraneural, its machinery is entirely explained 
by computational (specifically predictive) processes in the brain. Dave Ward 
(2012) disagrees, on the basis of the fundamentally enactivist assertion that 
experience should always be understood as an interaction between individuals 
and their environments. For Ward, accepting the extraneural distribution of 
consciousness is simply the logical result of an enactive understanding. If 
experience is fundamentally processual and interactive, then the machinery of 
the different contributors to the interaction—both in the individual and in the 
environment—must play fundamental roles in what defines the experience. 
However, whether we are aware of the extensions of our experiences or not is a 
separate question. As is argued in this chapter, dance-music vibes are neither 
more nor less extended than other experiences: they are simply experiences in 
which the distribution of cognitive and affective processes across mind, body, 
and environment becomes both mentally and physically noticeable.
Affective atmosphere and smooth space
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The collective effervescence that Durkheim described suggests that shared 
emotions can have a dynamic physicality. When people gather together and 
engage in a shared activity—be it sitting in a courtroom quietly observing a 
gruelling court case, or jumping and shouting vigorously in a sports stadium—
they can feel a certain affective atmosphere. To Slaby (2014), affective 
atmospheres exemplify the phenomenal coupling that occurs between an 
affective agent and an environment expressing affect-like qualities. The 
phenomenologist Hermann Schmitz states that ‘emotions are atmospheres 
poured  (p.98) out spatially’ (Schmitz et al. 2011: 255). In his radically anti-
dualist approach, the sensing and emoting body is posited as a felt surfaceless 
space, one that is not measurable or locational, but that exists in embodied 
experience. As surfaceless atmospheres, emotions exist in public space and are 
confined to neither body nor mind. Schmitz describes them as ‘half-entities’ in 
which cause and effect are one and the same, and duration can be interrupted; 
they are like ‘the wind, voices, the sense of overpowering gravity, electric 
shocks, pain, melodies and many sounds such as a shrill whistle or an ear-
piercing noise, night, time, especially if it seems to become unbearably long in 
boredom or tense anticipation’ (Schmitz et al. 2011: 256).
Schmitz’s notion of emotions as atmospheres assumes comparable importance 
in Friedlind Riedel’s study of the Sunday worship services of the Closed Brethren 
Assemblies in Germany (2015). Riedel argues that the apparent ineffability of 
music—in worship services but also in social music events more broadly—comes 
from its multisensory rather than purely auditory attributes. In such situations, 
music is to be understood not simply as performance but as atmosphere (Riedel 
2015: 95). Being a musical atmosphere, the affectivity of worship is diffused 
across the minds and bodies of the worshippers, the vocal sounds of the hymns, 
the reverberations, lights, and scents of the church, and the Holy Spirit that is 
believed to be present. For the participants, the liminality of the atmosphere 
affords a ‘new’ experience in the form of spiritual renewal and proximity to God.
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Riedel relates the idea of affective atmosphere as surfaceless space to Deleuze 
and Guattari’s (1987) notion of ‘smooth space’. In contrast to ‘striated space’, 
which is a ‘metered space initiated by stratification, hierarchisation and 
centralisation, productive of dichotomies and static identities’ (Riedel 2015: 
103),2 smooth space is a space of intensities that do not correspond to 
delineated objects and subjects, and where feelings and events exist as 
constellations of things, movements, and processual ‘becomings’ (2015: 103). 
Riedel argues that smooth space can transform into striated space through 
repetition, inscribed in the musical repertoire and engendered in the power 
relations of the Church. When certain hymns are performed on a weekly basis, 
their atmospheres become idealized and canonized, contributing to the 
establishment of doctrine. Nonetheless, in the process of becoming within the 
smooth space, subjectivity and affectivity remain indeterminate. And because 
atmosphere is a ‘half-thing’, one cannot separate cause from effect or agent from 
action, echoing enactivist theories of cognition and perception (Thompson 2010). 
In the worship of the Closed Brethren, ‘the attendees perceptually become
“Children of God” and “brothers” of their “Lord Jesus Christ” ’ (Riedel 2015: 
100); but because there is no achievable end-goal in the musical and affective 
atmosphere, becoming is endless and the worshippers know that they will never 
actually reach sainthood.
 (p.99) The feeling of dancing in a nightclub or at an outdoor rave is clearly 
very different from that of quiet religious worship.3 Yet the idea of smooth space 
has also provided dance-music researchers with a way of understanding the 
liminality of raving and clubbing. In Tim Jordan’s analysis (1995), raves are 
described as ‘vast celebrations [where] participants gradually lose subjective 
belief in their self and merge into a collective body’ (1995: 125). The smooth 
space of raves is where the ‘desiring-production’ of the rave is transformed into 
a ‘desiring-machine’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987), an assemblage of music, 
dance, drugs, and lights where ravers strive for a desubjectified state of rapture 
and euphoria. Making reference to another of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts—
the ‘body without organs’ (BwO), in which organ functions are not fixed (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987)—Jordan writes:
The BwO of raving is the undifferentiated state that supports the 
connections that the rave-machine makes between its different elements. 
This undifferentiated state is a collective delirium produced by thousands 
of people jointly making the connections of drugs to dance, music to dance, 
dance to drugs, drugs to time, time to music and so on, and thereby 
gradually constructing the state of raving and so the BwO of raving. The 
delirium is non-subjective and smooth, as all the connections and functions 
of the machine give way to simple intensities of feeling. (Jordan 1995: 130)
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Just as the surfacelessness and ineffability of congregational music afford the 
affective atmosphere of religious worship (Riedel 2015), so does the smoothness 
and lack of differentiation of dance music offer the collective delirium of raving 
(Jordan 1995). The smoothness of these experiences is largely due to the 
indeterminacy of their various components, a point to which I return.
Vibe and embodied distribution in clubbing and raving
At raves and in clubs, the affective atmosphere is referred to as the 
‘vibe’ (Fikentsher 2000)—a term that ravers and clubbers use frequently and 
which appears in several of the rave testimonials on hyperreal.org. One raver 
writes on the website: ‘When you open your heart, and trust the whole group 
you dance with; when you feel love with everyone, and they return it, a higher 
vibration can be reached. This happens when a crowd is deep into the vibe of 
House.’ The vibe is collectively shaped by a range of elements, such as the DJ 
and the music that they are playing, the dancers and their style of movement, 
the particular space of the club or the landscape (in the case of outdoor raves or 
festivals), the sound level, the tactile vibrations of the bass, the tempo, the 
lighting, the temperature, the smell, and the fashion. While some of these 
elements remain more or less stable throughout the night (the space and the 
sound level), many of them fluctuate and are dynamically transformed on a 
minute-by-minute or hour-by-hour basis (the changing of DJs, arrival of new 
clubbers, rising heat).
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 (p.100) As the previous rave testimonial makes explicit, vibe is short for 
vibration—which points to an important aspect of the affective atmosphere of 
clubbing and raving that sets it apart from many other kinds of affective 
atmospheres, such as that of the Closed Brethren described by Riedel (2015). 
The vibe has a distinctive rhythmic quality, as acknowledged by Sally Sommer, 
who defines vibe as ‘an active communal force, a feeling, a rhythm that is 
created by the mix of dancers, the balance of loud music, the effects of darkness 
and light, the energy. Everything interlocks to produce a powerful sense of 
liberation. The vibe [is] an active, exhilarating feeling of “now-ness” that 
everything is coming together—that a good party is in the making’ (Sommer 
2001: 73). Rhythm is also central in Kai Fikentscher’s account of 1990’s dance-
music culture in New York, where it is conceived as a ‘synchronising force, 
facilitating the process in which a vibe is created, shaped, and 
maintained’ (Fikentscher 2000: 80). First and foremost, it is the rhythmically 
regular beat that binds the DJ, the music, and the dancers together. Keeping the 
beat going, through careful choices of records and beat-matching, is a defining 
goal for the DJ—just as it is also the task of the dancers to keep the beat, 
irrespective of stylistic differences in the ways in which clubbers dance to 
different kinds of music. The light shows at dance clubs are also often 
rhythmical, further contributing to the rhythmicity of the vibe. But it is not just 
simple synchronization between these different modalities of rhythm that makes 
the vibe: it is the particular ways in which the rhythms in dancers’ movements, 
the music, and the lights interlock that give the vibe its affective character.
I have argued elsewhere (Witek 2017) that there is a special rhythmic quality in 
electronic dance music, such as house and techno, that particularly facilitates 
this interlocking of music and dancers. In these musics, and in groove-based 
music more generally, the rhythms are frequently syncopated, often to the extent 
that they form polyrhythms. These syncopations generate gaps in the rhythmic 
surface, and the desire to move that we feel with syncopated groove-based 
music is our body’s response to the invitation to fill these gaps, by synchronizing 
and moving to the beat. In this way, dancers actively participate in the musical 
structure and literally enact the beat of the music—a powerful example of the 
musically extended mind and body. In becoming part of the music by filling in 
the gaps when we dance, we dissolve the boundaries between our minds, our 
bodies, and the music. Even when we listen without moving our bodies, we fill in 
the gaps virtually, with our embodied attention.
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But it is not just the temporal structure of the beat that facilitates embodied and 
social distribution. Luis-Manuel Garcia (2015) explains how the texture and 
granularity typical of electronic dance-music production gives the music tactile 
and haptic qualities that afford a kind of sensory-affective bridging between 
touch, sonic experience, and connectedness on the dance floor. The direct 
impact of the beat, caused by high-amplitude bass frequencies and sharp attack 
envelopes, can be physically felt in the body with most dance club sound 
systems. Furthermore, many of the sounds used in house and techno have a 
distinctly bodily or ‘fleshy’ quality, often as a result of the direct sampling of 
body sounds (the most common of which is hand claps). Finally, the granularity 
of much electronic dance-music sound production facilitates experiences that 
index the sense of touch: by  (p.101) manipulating their microtemporal 
structure, for example by smoothing and sustaining their decay, sounds can be 
heard as having a sonic grain that is cross-modally associated with a particular 
feel to the touch. This multisensory experience of tactility in electronic dance 
music adds to the distributed sense of sociability and blurring of boundaries 
between dancers/listeners and music because, as Garcia points out, ‘touch is an 
inherently interactive mode of perception’ (2015: 71).
Elsewhere, Garcia makes explicit both the metaphorical (as atmosphere or 
affect) and literal meaning (as physical force) of vibe and vibration in electronic 
dance music (Garcia, in press). Based on interviews with dancers and 
performers in the Berlin dance-music scene, he lays out an ‘ontology of vibration 
and resonance’ in electronic dance music that links affect to collective 
experience. The sociability and affectivity of the vibe is mediated by 
synchronously vibrating, resonating with, or attuning to the music—especially at 
the physically felt bass frequencies: ‘vibrational affect in the form of sound 
waves fill the surrounding space and reverberate back to the sound-source, 
affecting the self but also folding the external world into relations of absorption, 
reflection, and complex interference’ (Garcia, in press).
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There are plenty of other phenomenological descriptions in ethnographic and 
cultural studies of clubbing and raving that are consistent with the idea of 
affectively and socially extended minds. An explicit parallel is found in Silvia 
Rief’s work on dance-club identity politics, which presents clubbing as a 
‘prosthetic culture’—a term that ‘refers to a new technique of self by means of 
experimentation, through which aspects previously deemed immutable, fixed 
and automatic are brought into the realm of volition, conscious calculation and 
intentional modification … [P]rosthetic culture is … about self-extension’ (2011: 
97). Similarly, Ben Malbon (2002: 108) describes ‘the sensation of oneness and 
the liminality of self/wider group that can be experienced within apparently 
diverse dancing crowds’, and reflects upon the shared experience with his fellow 
clubbers of ‘want[ing] the music to take us over; to become us in some 
way’ (Malbon 2002: xii). He quotes one of his informants as saying that in the 
dance club, ‘you feel that you’re the conductor—you ARE the music’ (Malbon 
2002: 91). Malbon describes experiences of ‘being somehow taken outside of or 
beyond oneself—especially while dancing’, invoking Freud’s description of 
‘oceanic’ experiences: ‘a feeling of an indissoluble bond, of being one with the 
external world as a whole’ (Freud 1961: 65, cited in Malbon 2002: 107). 
Hillegonda Rietveld observes that at raves, ‘egos melt in the sweltering frenzied 
heat of the mass of sweating bodies’ (Rietveld 1993: 63), to which Jordan adds 
that ‘ravers may no longer notice the lights, the other ravers or the music as 
separate elements but feel them as one intense event’ (Jordan 1995: 130). From 
these and similar statements, it is apparent that the blurring that is experienced 
at raves and in clubs is not just between dancers’ individual subjectivities, but 
also between their subjectivities and the sounds of the music as well as other 
multisensory stimulations such as temperature, visual effects, and drugs.
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As Krueger (2013, 2015) has argued, it is likely that entrainment provides an 
important cognitive and sensorimotor mechanism in enabling affective and 
social extension. Even when the rhythms of electronic dance music are 
syncopated, listeners/dancers  (p.102) are expected to perceive the beat and 
successfully synchronize to it through the coupling of their attentional processes 
to the implied metrical framework. However, in raving and clubbing, the role of 
entrainment is not only to facilitate the offloading of dancers’ emotions onto the 
music. Rather, ravers and clubbers become part of a greater distributed affective 
system, a ‘half-thing’ like the affective atmospheres described by Schmitz, in 
which cause and effect are blurred (Schmitz et al. 2011). The vibe is not just the 
extension of an emotion from subjects to the music to which they are listening or 
dancing—although such limited subject-to-music extensions are certainly 
possible. The vibe is distributed across a much greater variety of external 
objects and other subjects—indeed, it does not originate in an individual dancer 
in the first place. The vibe is a collective energy that can quickly be transformed 
as a result of both subtle and dramatic changes in one or more of the 
contributing elements, such as when the DJ changes to a more ambient record, 
or when a group of clubbers enters the dance floor looking for trouble.
Social media reports of a particularly legendary night at one of the world’s most 
famous clubs illustrate this kind of change. Berghain is a Berlin nightclub in a 
converted power plant, which first opened as a gay club (Garcia 2011). Despite 
subsequent changes in its audience due to its national and international 
reputation, it is still associated with liberated sexuality. Parties at Berghain will 
often last from Friday until Monday, adding to the timelessness of the vibe. 
There are two main dance floors—one a cavernous open concrete room, the 
other, the Panorama bar, a more intimate space; and there are many smaller 
spaces, passageways, and a chill-out area. All of the spaces are either pitch dark 
or dimly lit (although during the daytime, daylight will inevitably filter through 
the building’s large windows, some of them stained glass), and the dance floors 
are lit with moving, often rhythmical and colourful light. On this particular night, 
there was a thunderstorm, and lightning struck the building, with interesting 
consequences for the vibe. Dustin Zahn, one of the DJs who played that night, 
describes the events:
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The club was packed during the hottest day of the summer but around 
22:45, a storm came through and lightning struck Berghain … The 
emergency power kicked in, which turned on every light in the house and 
killed the air conditioning. For 5 hours, the lights remained on and the 
place kept getting hotter with people ramming the dance floor going crazy 
to [DJ] Pär Grindvik’s now legendary set. 10 minutes before I took over, 
they fixed the light situation and the crowd went crazy. With the lights off, 
a new vibe took over and ¾ of the dance floor was topless. There was no 
separation of class, sex or race: just skin, dancing and great, positive vibes. 
During all my sets, I’ve never seen anything like this from the Berghain DJ 
booth before. (Quoted in Karwowski 2016)
The atmospheric lighting of Berghain is normally an important constituent of the 
vibe, which the harsh emergency lighting would be expected to attenuate rather 
than amplify, though apparently not in this case. Rather, the emergency lights 
added to it, almost as if the storm—the electricity of the lightning—had 
energized the vibe into an even more intense level of collective effervescence, to 
use Durkheim’s term (1912/1995). When the emergency lighting was finally 
replaced by the usual club lights, the vibe was further amplified, reaching the 
deindividuated state that the DJ describes. As this singular event demonstrates, 
there is no fixed recipe for the vibe. It can never be fully controlled by any one
 (p.103) person, event, or circumstance, but is a collective energy, in which 
specific elements may influence it in particular ways (for example the lighting), 
but which may be displaced—unpredictably and temporarily in this case—by 
totally unanticipated developments (the lightning).
The primary consciousness of clubbing and raving
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Even if the origin of the vibe is non-anthropocentric, the vibe is of course 
subjectively experienced by everyone present in the club—though not 
necessarily all the time or in the same way. And this subjective experience is 
afforded by the social, affective, and cognitive distribution of the vibe. Eric
Clarke (2011) suggests that when we listen to and engage with music, we can 
experience a kind of musical consciousness that is set apart from our normal 
waking consciousness. He draws on the distinction between primary and higher-
order consciousness made by Antonio Damasio (1999) where primary 
consciousness is ‘roughly equivalent to what is in an organism’s current 
awareness, or the contents of its perceptual present’ (Clarke 2011: 194).4
Primary consciousness depends upon the organism’s sensorimotor engagement 
with the world, and is largely non-verbal and behavioural—a kind of bodily and 
proprioceptive knowing. Higher-order consciousness, in contrast, is largely 
verbal and ‘brings with it the capacity to be aware of, and reflect on, a past and 
a future—most specifically the narrative of events that constitutes a person’s 
autobiographical self’ (Clarke 2011: 195). In response to Edelman’s (1989) claim 
that higher-order consciousness cannot be suppressed once acquired, Clarke 
suggests that intense musical experiences provide a way for the subject to 
temporarily bypass or ‘silence’ higher-order consciousness and recapture such 
primarily corporeal and affective states. He cites dancing to music as one such 
intensely physical and affective musical experience that may give access to 
primary consciousness. Clubbers and ravers can clearly reach the kinds of high-
intensity experiences that bypass reflexive and discursive awareness, commonly 
reporting states of ‘ecstasy’, ‘timelessness’, and ‘eternal present’ (Malbon 2002;
Rief 2011).
However, as Malbon emphasizes, clubbers and ravers are not in a trance.5 He 
insists that the ‘exstasis’ that is experienced never completely eliminates the 
agency of dancers, and that in ‘working together’ on the dance floor they gain ‘a 
greater control and power through the loss of control’ (Malbon 2002: 114). In 
other words, the cognitive, affective, and social distribution of the vibe can also 
produce intensely personal experiences:
Some control of the body is ceded to the music and the crowd, yet through 
this semi- or unconscious ceding a heightened sense of control over the 
body can be established. The apotheosis of this  (p.104) phenomenon is 
that clubbers can lose a sense of themselves as entities separate from the 
crowd—they feel lost in the crowd—yet they can use this sense of merging 
and harmony with the crowd as a context for interpretation and 
contemplation of self. (Malbon 2002: 114)
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Thus, the primary musical consciousness of clubbing and raving provides the 
building ground for the various performances of identity and sexuality with 
which this subculture is associated (Fikentscher 2000; Gilbert and Pearson 1999;
Rief 2011; Thornton 1995). When the vibe provides the right conditions, dancers 
can be both ‘lost and found’ in music (Clarke 2014).
As Damasio and Edelman recognize, primary consciousness remains present in 
the background during normal waking consciousness; higher-order 
consciousness does not eliminate other more embodied and immediate forms of 
knowing and engaging with the environment. But when we consciously and 
deliberately reflect on (or speak of) our own experiences, this primary mode of 
consciousness may recede from our awareness. And while intensely listening to, 
dancing to, and otherwise engaging with music may allow people to experience 
a state of primary consciousness in which the mind and body are cognitively, 
socially, and affectively distributed, such extended notions of the self are not 
excluded from situations in which higher-order consciousness dominates our 
awareness. Extended mind theory does not only apply to out-of-the-ordinary 
experiences like clubbing and raving: it is a theory of how the mind works all the 
time. The mind is always extended when we listen to music, but when our 
musical experiences are intensely engaging, such as when clubbing and raving, 
that extension can be more palpably felt. Primary consciousness is the level at 
which we directly experience our ‘selves’ as wrapped up in the world, rather 
than in the more mediated, reflective, and self-conscious condition of higher-
order consciousness. Clubbing, raving, and other ‘oceanic’ experiences are 
special because they put us more in touch with this condition and help us realize 
that what we understand as ‘self’ is always already partly extended.
Neural correlates of primary consciousness
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What, then, is happening to individual dancers when they experience themselves 
as extensions of the vibe? Are out-of-the-ordinary ‘oceanic’ experiences 
characterized by out-of-the-ordinary neurophysiological functioning in the 
organism? If the smooth space of an affective atmosphere like the vibe 
encompasses the mind as much as the body and the environment, then what is 
happening in the brain when the primary level of consciousness comes to the 
fore? While it is currently next to impossible to observe what happens in the 
brain when we experience the affective atmosphere of dancing6—not only 
because of the restrictions on movement inside most brain scanners but also due 
to the difficulty in reconstructing something as complex and indeterminate as 
vibe in a laboratory setting—there are other ‘oceanic’ experiences that lend 
themselves more easily to  (p.105) neuroscientific investigation, and that can 
offer instructive parallels. One such ‘oceanic’ experience which has recently 
come under increasing scrutiny is the psychedelic state. In what follows, the 
extent to which the affective experiences of raving and clubbing might be 
mirrored by the affective experiences induced by psychedelic substances will be 
considered, followed by a review of some functional neuroimaging research 
using psychedelic drugs to study primary consciousness. This neuroimaging 
research suggests that the spatiotemporal complexity—specifically the criticality, 
metastability, or entropy—of neural network dynamics may be significant in 
explaining primary consciousness and extended mind.
Psychedelics are a collection of psychoactive drugs whose active ingredients 
occur naturally in certain plants or mushrooms (e.g. psilocybin mushrooms) or 
artificially in some designer drugs (e.g. LSD).7 Their effects include perceptual 
changes (visual pseudo-hallucinations, illusions, and synaesthesia), cognitive 
changes (increased sense of meaning), affective changes (feelings of 
transcendence, grief, joy, and anxiety), and changes in subjectivity (feelings of 
ego-dissolution) (Griffiths et al. 2006). The most obvious association between 
psychedelics and raving and clubbing is that many clubbers and ravers use 
psychedelic drugs to enhance their experiences (Palamar et al. 2017). It has 
been suggested that the ecstatic experiences associated with clubbing and 
raving are often short-lived and fleeting unless drugs are involved (Malbon 
2002). Although psychedelics are used, the more common drug in rave and 
clubbing culture is Ecstasy, whose main active ingredient is MDMA (Palamar et 
al. 2017). This drug is reported to prolong and intensify the ‘oceanic’ 
experiences that dancing to house and techno music affords (Malbon 2002, 109). 
MDMA elicits intense experiences of euphoria, emotional warmth, openness, and 
empathy towards others (Bedi et al. 2009; Dumont and Verkes 2006). It is often 
considered ‘psychedelic-like’ (Carhart-Harris et al. 2014) or a ‘stimulant/
psychedelic hybrid’ (Roseman et al. 2014), suggesting that the states it elicits 
approach, but seldom reach, the full intensity of true psychedelic substances 
such as psilocybin and LSD.
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The use of psychedelic and psychedelic-like drugs at dance clubs and raves can 
partly be explained by the overlap in the affective states they afford. In fact, the 
term ‘vibe’ first entered into the discourse of dance-music culture via its 
counter-cultural predecessors, not least via psychedelic counter-culture, in 
which ‘vibrations were imagined to be an invisible linking force between 
participants, promising to forge bonds through sound that would overcome the 
hierarchies and antagonisms of hegemonic culture’ (Garcia, in press). 
Furthermore, the experience of ‘ego-dissolution’—‘a feeling that one’s “self”, 
“ego” or “I” is disintegrating or that the border between one’s self and the 
external world is “dissolving” ’ (Lebedev et al. 2015: 3137)—is reported in both 
empirical research with psychedelics and in ethnographic studies of dance-music 
cultures. This is exemplified in the hyperreal.org quotation at the beginning of 
this chapter and further elaborated in the section ‘Vibe and embodied 
distribution in clubbing and raving’. In their study  (p.106) of psychedelics, 
Robin Carhart-Harris and colleagues have made connections between primary 
consciousness and ‘oceanic states’, citing Freud (1961) and Walter Stace’s 
(1960) descriptions of experiences where ‘the complex multiplicity of normal 
consciousness collapses into a simpler state where a sense of an all-
encompassing “oneness” with others, the world and/or “God” is felt’ (Carhart-
Harris 2014: 15; italics in original). The overlapping experiences of ‘ego 
dissolution’, ‘oceanic states’, and primary consciousness suggest that an 
awareness of extended or ‘expanded’ mind might provide a link between 
psychedelic and dance-music experiences.
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By administering psychedelic drugs to their research participants in placebo-
controlled experiments, Carhart-Harris and colleagues have claimed that they 
have experimentally induced states of primary consciousness, thus enabling the 
study of the brain’s functional transformations during such embodied 
awareness. One of their main findings is that psychedelics seem to increase the 
complexity of the brain’s functional organization. From studies using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), they reported that when psilocybin was 
administered to their participants, ‘cerebral blood flow, BOLD signal, functional 
connectivity and oscillatory power were decreased in brain regions that are 
normally highly metabolically active, functionally connected and synchronous/
organized in their activity’ (Carhart-Harris et al. 2014: 6).8 In other words, the 
psychedelic brain seems less organized overall than the normal brain. The 
investigators also found that, following administration of psilocybin, the brain’s 
default mode network (DMN) behaved differently (Carhart-Harris et al. 2012). 
The DMN is a network of brain regions that are densely connected and 
functionally correlated when an individual is not consciously focusing on the 
outside world.9 That is, in the absence of a specific task, the brain falls ‘by 
default’ into a specific neurofunctional pattern (Greicius et al. 2003). Activity in 
the DMN has been associated with a number of metacognitive operations that 
are characteristic of higher-order consciousness, such as self-reflection (Qin and 
Northoff 2011), theory of mind (Spreng and Grady 2010), and mental time travel 
(Buckner and Carroll 2007). Carhart-Harris and colleagues (2012) found that 
during a psychedelic state, the brain exhibited reduced coupling between the 
medial temporal lobe (MTL) and the DMN—a functional connection that is 
implicated in normal waking consciousness. In addition, the brain exhibited 
increased BOLD signal variance in the MTL, consistent with decreased 
connectivity between the MTL and the DMN. The authors thus proposed that 
coupling in the DMN—specifically between the DMN and the MTL—is a neural 
correlate of higher-order consciousness and a sense of self. When these areas 
are decoupled, such as during the psychedelic state, primary consciousness is 
more dominant, and the sense of ego is attenuated (Carhart-Harris et al. 2014).
 (p.107) Schartner et al. (2017) provide further empirical support for the 
increased complexity of the brain’s functional organization during the 
psychedelic state. Using magnetoencephalography (MEG), the authors showed 
that the signal diversity, or entropy, of the brain’s neurophysiological patterns is 
increased following the administration of psilocybin, LSD, and ketamine. 
Importantly, the study participants’ subjective reports of the psychedelic 
experience correlated with the neural signal diversity, suggesting that increased 
brain entropy is correlated with more intense psychedelic experiences. These 
results are consistent with the idea that levels of consciousness can be indicated 
by levels of neural complexity. Carhart-Harris et al. (2014) suggest that the brain 
is more entropic during states of primary consciousness, and specifically that it 
involves increased neural criticality and metastability.
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Criticality is a network state that occurs at the transition from an ordered to 
disordered state, when the system approaches ‘the edge of chaos’ (Sporns 2010: 
268).10 Compared to subcritical and supercritical systems, a critical system 
undergoes the largest and fastest fluctuations, and is the most susceptible to 
perturbation. Any change to the system will rearrange the system’s organization. 
In the brain, such criticality in the neural networks gives rise to what has been 
termed ‘metastability’ in brain dynamics. Metastability in the brain is a sequence 
of transient states each of which is neither entirely stable nor entirely unstable 
(Tognoli and Kelso 2014). It describes a balance between neural integration 
(when neural spiking is synchronized) and segregation (uncoupled spiking), with 
moments of local synchrony that are never phase-locked. Each metastable state 
depends on the underlying network’s functional relationships, and the 
transitions between these transient metastable states result in ‘switching’ 
between networks. Such complex yet relatively coordinated neural dynamics are 
thought to facilitate maximal flexibility in how the brain is configured: any 
change or perturbation can trigger a reorganization of the system. When the 
brain is close to criticality and metastable, it is thought to provide access to 
increasingly diverse neural configurations and cognitive states (Kringelbach et 
al. 2015).
What Carhart-Harris et al. (2014) suggest is that the criticality- and 
metastability-consistent evidence of increased entropy in the brain could 
potentially play a part in the subjectively experienced richness, ‘randomness’, 
openness, and perceptual and cognitive enhancements associated with the 
psychedelic state. During normal higher-order consciousness, the brain is 
subcritical, and can in this way better control how it engages with the 
environment by having a firmer grasp on sensory inputs, tuning in only to 
relevant perceptual information. By contrast, in induced primary consciousness 
as elicited by psychedelics, the brain is supercritical. People on psychedelic 
drugs can be hypersensitive to even the smallest sensory perturbations, and may 
be abnormally concerned with a greater  (p.108) and more complex array of 
inputs afforded by the environment. Carhart-Harris’s research suggests that this 
relates to the metastable spatiotemporal dynamics of the brain that psychedelics 
induce.
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If there are any similarities between the ‘oceanic’ experiences of primary 
consciousness (and thus an awareness of extended mind) afforded by 
psychedelics and those afforded by dancing to house and techno music and 
getting into the vibe of a dance party, then it is also possible that the brain 
operates in a similar way during clubbing and raving as in the psychedelic state. 
In other words, it may be that in addition to already known neural correlates of 
music—such as rhythm responses in the basal ganglia and motor areas (Chen 
2008; Grahn and Brett 2007; Vuust and Roepstorff 2008) and musical pleasure 
responses in the ventral striatum and orbitofrontal cortex (Blood and Zatorre 
2001; Salimpoor et al. 2011; Vuust and Kringelbach 2010)—the increased neural 
entropy that supports the extended consciousness of psychedelic experiences 
would also be found during the extended consciousness of clubbing and raving. 
Feeling at one with the music and the crowd, and the cognitive, social, and 
affective distribution that people experience in a dance club, may be related to 
increased neural metastability.
Conclusion
This chapter has applied affective and social extensions of theories of cognitive 
distribution to the musical consciousness associated with dancing in house and 
techno clubs, raves, and dance-music festivals. The vibe of a dance party is an 
example of ‘affective atmosphere’: a smooth, surfaceless space where 
subjectivity is secondary to feeling intensities. This vibe is defined as a 
cognitively, socially, affectively, bodily, and environmentally distributed 
phenomenon that has a distinct rhythmic and textural quality, and that cannot be 
reduced to its individual parts—the music, the DJ, the dancers, the club or rave 
space, the lights, the temperature, or the drugs. When the vibe reaches a high 
intensity—when experiences become oceanic, timeless, and ecstatic—it affords a 
musical state that resembles primary consciousness, in which bodily and felt 
knowing prevail over reflexive and analytic knowledge. While we do not yet 
know the neurofunctional architecture of the brain during such intensely 
pleasurable experiences of dancing, we can draw on other neuroimaging studies 
in which states of primary consciousness are induced via psychedelic drugs. 
These studies suggest that primary consciousness is associated with decreased 
coupling between certain brain networks and increased complexity, criticality 
and metastability in the brain. A similarly entropic brain could support the 
cognitive, social, and affective distribution that clubbers and ravers experience 
when they synchronize their bodies to the beat and to the movements of the 
dancers around them, and feel at one with the music, the crowd, and the world.
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We might predict, however, that without psychoactive drugs, the metastability of 
the club dancers’ neural networks would be reduced. If we accept that drugs 
such as MDMA—or indeed psychedelic substances such as psilocybin and LSD—
are used to enhance the oceanic experiences that clubbers and ravers can only 
experience fleetingly  (p.109) without drugs, then we can hypothesize that the 
sober experience is a less prolonged and less intense version of the drugged 
experience. Furthermore, there may be important differences between the 
experience of a musical vibe and primary consciousness understood as a more 
general state of musical listening. Listening is never completely ‘passive’ and 
usually involves some level —albeit often covert—of active engagement and 
multisensory perception. Nonetheless, it seems that the active and explicitly 
multisensory state of clubbing and raving can make these aspects of musical 
experience more intense than other more motionless and solitary ways of 
listening to music.
Finally, what makes the vibe stand out from other forms of primary musical 
consciousness is the explicit manifestation and celebration of cognitive, social, 
and affective distribution—leading to those detailed descriptions of feelings of 
oneness that are found on hyperreal.org. With ‘everyday’ listening, we may be 
less conscious of how our minds and bodies are intertwined with the music and 
our surroundings—in the same way that conscious awareness of the vibe’s 
distributed character is typically not a narrative type of awareness during the 
experience itself. In the act of dancing and raving, at least to the seasoned raver, 
the vibe is an embodied, felt kind of knowing that is only recounted in retrospect
—only represented in higher consciousness once the raver has come off the 
dance floor or gone home from the party. Ultimately, the socio-affective 
distribution of the vibe relies on both immediate, primary consciousness as well 
as narrative, higher consciousness. It is the vibe as felt in the ‘smooth’ moment, 
and as reflected on in those ‘striated’ face-to-face and online discussions, that 
sustains dance music cultures as social and affective communities.
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Notes:
(1) Clark and Chalmers formally state their ‘parity principle’ as follows: ‘If, as we
confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it
done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the
cognitive process, then that part of the world is part of the cognitive
process’ (Clark and Chalmers 1998: 8).
(2) According to Riedel, the notions of smooth and striated space were borrowed
by Deleuze and Guattari from Pierre Boulez (Riedel 2015: 102).
(3) Although some have pointed out the religious, specifically tribal and
shamanistic, aspects of dance-music culture (St John 2008).
(4) Clarke uses Edelman’s (1989) terminology of ‘core’ and ‘extended’
consciousness to refer to this same distinction. However, in order to avoid
confusion between Edelman’s ‘extended consciousness’ and ‘extended mind’ as
discussed in this chapter, I will use Damasio’s terms ‘primary’ and ‘higher-order’
consciousness.
(5) This contrasts with the ‘deep listeners’ that Judith Becker (2004) describes in
her work.
(6) However, see Hove et al. 2016 for a study on functional connectivity—the
extent to which neural activity is correlated across areas of the brain—during
trance induced by repetitive drumming.
(7) They are classified as C-class drugs and are thus illegal in most countries.
(8) BOLD stands for ‘blood-oxygenated-level-dependent’, and is used as an
indicator of brain metabolism and thus neural activity.
(9) The DMN has its ‘hubs’ in the posterior cingulate cortex, medial prefrontal
cortex, and angular gyrus.
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(10) A heated magnet provides an example of a critical system (Chialvo 2010). At
low temperatures, the system is ordered, exhibiting directionally aligned
electron spins. As the system is heated, the spins become increasingly
disorganized, resulting in decreased magnetism, until the critical temperature is
reached, beyond which the magnetism disappears due to the mutual cancelling
out of the disordered spins.
